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PROHIBITING THE EXECUTION OF
THE MENTALLY RETARDED
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sen-
tence of life imprisonment, however long. Death, in its final-
ity, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year
prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because
of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding differ-
ence in the need for reliability in the determination that death
is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.
. INTRODUCTION
On June 20, 2002, the Supreme Court held that executing a men-
tally retarded defendant was unconstitutional.2 It concluded that in
light of the evolving standards of decency, such a punishment was
excessive.3  It reached this conclusion by noting that the practice of
executing the mentally retarded had become truly unusual, and find-
ing that a national consensus had developed against such a practice.4
Immediately prior to this decision, eighteen states5 and the federal
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Stewart, J.).
2 Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002).
I d. at 2244.
4 Id. at 2246-2250.
5 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2001) ("the court shall not impose the death penalty
on a person who is found to have mental retardation"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(b) (Michie
1993) ("No defendant with mental retardation at the time of committing capital murder shall be
sentenced to death."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-9-403 (Supp. 1994) ("A sentence of death shall
not be imposed upon any defendant who is determined to be a mentally retarded defendant
pursuant to section 16-9-402."); FLA. STAT. ch. 921.137(2) (2002) ("A sentence of death may
not be imposed upon a defendant convicted of a capital felony if it is determined in accordance
with this section that the defendant has mental retardation."); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1310)
(1990 & Supp. 1994) ("In the trial of any case in which the death penalty is sought which com-
mences on or after July 1, 1988, should the judge find in accepting a plea of guilty but mentally
retarded or the jury or court find in its verdict that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged
but mentally retarded, the death penalty shall not be imposed and the court shall sentence the
defendant to imprisonment for life."); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-6 (West Supp. 1994) ("If the
court determines that the defendant is a mentally retarded individual under section 5 of this
chapter, the part of the state's charging instrument filed under IC 35-50-2-9(a) that seeks a death
sentence against the defendant shall be dismissed."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(d) (Supp.
1994) ("If, at the conclusion of a hearing pursuant to this section, the court determines that the
defendant is mentally retarded, the court shall sentence the defendant as otherwise provided by
law, and no sentence of death shall be imposed hereunder."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.140
(Michie 2001) ("(N]o offender who has been determined to be a seriously mentally retarded
offender under the provisions of KRS 532.135, shall be subject to execution."); MD. CODE
ANN., art. 27 § 412(g)(1) (1992) ("If a person found guilty of murder in the first degree was, at
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government prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded, 6 a con-
dition that affects approximately 2-3% of the population.7 However,
the Court did leave the task of determining which defendants were
mentally retarded to the states.8 Although I do not agree with the
Court that a national consensus has developed against executing the
mentally retarded, I do believe that the Court correctly concluded that
this type of punishment is cruel and unusual.
This Note will look at the treatment of the mentally retarded and
juveniles and attempt to establish that it violates the Eighth Amend-
ment to execute both groups. It will prove that because the character-
istics of mental retardation and juveniles are similar, the Supreme
Court was correct in banning the executing of members from both
groups. Just as the Court considered general characteristics of juve-
niles when holding that it is cruel and unusual punishment to execute
them as a class, so too was it correct that the Court used generaliza-
tions about the mentally retarded to exempt that class from execution.
Part I will discuss the different definitions of mental retardation and
the characteristics that are associated with someone having this dis-
ease. Part II will provide the history of the death penalty from
the time the murder was committed, less than 18 years old or if the person establishes by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the person was, at the time the murder was committed, mentally
retarded, the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life or imprisonment for life without
the possibility of parole and may not be sentenced to death."); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030(1)
(2001) ("The trier shall assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment without eligibil-
ity for probation, parole, or release except by act of the governor: (1) if the trier finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally retarded."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
105.01(2) (2001) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death penalty shall not be
imposed on any person with mental retardation."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2. I(B) (Michie
1994) ("The penalty of death shall not be imposed on any person who is mentally retarded.");
N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(12)(c) (McKinney 2002) ("In the event the defendant is sen-
tenced pursuant to this section to death, the court shall thereupon render a finding with respect
to whether the defendant is mentally retarded, If the court finds the defendant is mentally re-
tarded, the court shall set aside the sentence of death and sentence the defendant either to life
imprisonment without parole or to a term of imprisonment for the class A-I felony of murder in
the first degree other than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole."); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-2005 (2002) ("[N]o defendant who is mentally retarded shall be sentenced to death."); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1 (Michie 2002) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the death penalty may not be imposed upon any person who was mentally retarded at the time of
the commission of the offense and whose mental retardation was manifested and documented
before the age of eighteen years."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(b) (1997) ("Notwithstand-
ing any provision of law to the contrary, no defendant with mental retardation at the time of
committing first degree murder shall be sentenced to death."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.95.030(2) (West 2002) ("In no case, however, shall a person be sentenced to death if the
person was mentally retarded at the time the crime was committed."); 2001 Conn. Legis. Serv.
151 (h) (West) ("The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury or,
if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict ... the defendant was a person with men-
tal retardation.").
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2000) ("A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a
person who is mentally retarded.").
7 Press Release, Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation 1, 2 (May 7, 1993).
8 Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2250.
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Furman v. Georgia to the present, focusing on the use of age and
mental retardation as mitigating factors in sentencing. Part III will
evaluate why executing juveniles and the mentally retarded is cruel
and unusual punishment based on the test established in Gregg v.
Georgia.10 This test states that punishment may be cruel and unusual
if (1) the punishment was banned when the Bill of Rights was en-
acted, (2) evolving standards on decency make the punishment cruel
and unusual now, or (3) the punishment is excessive. Finally, Part IV
will propose a legislative approach that states should use to determine
if a defendant is mentally retarded and thus excluded from the death
penalty. This proposal uses the 1992 American Association on Men-
tal Retardation (AAMR) definition of mental retardation and places
the burden on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence the existence of this condition. This proposed test will add
consistency to the application of the death penalty.
I. MENTAL RETARDATION
Before discussing why it was correct for the Court to treat the
mentally retarded in the same manner as juveniles with regard to the
death penalty, it is important to define what mental retardation is.
This, however, is slightly more complicated than it sounds. First,
there is more than one definition of mental retardation, and second,
these definitions are not static.
Generally, courts and legislatures have accepted the American
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) definition of mental re-
tardation. Until 1992, this condition was defined as "significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning" existing concurrently
with "impairments in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
developmental period."" First, "general intellectual functioning" was
measured by one or more standardized intelligence tests, and a "sig-
nificant subaverage" score was quantified as an IQ of 70 or below.' 2
The AAMR stressed that the IQ of 70 was not to be taken as an abso-
lute; it was designed to be a flexible standard. This flexibility allows
a person with an IQ over 70 who has special needs to be included in
the definition while excluding those people who have an IQ under 70
but do not meet the other criteria of the definition. 13 Second, "im-
pairments in adaptive behavior" was defined as significant limitations
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
10 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
" AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RE-
TARDATION 11 (Herbert J. Grossman ed., 1983).
12 Id.
" Id. at 23-24.
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on the ability of the person to behave as a normal member of his age
group. 14 Finally, the "developmental period" was defined as the time
between conception and the person's eighteenth birthday. 5 This
definition is significant because most states that prohibit the execution
of the mentally retarded define mental retardation according to this
standard.
16
In 1992, the AAMR refined its definition. Mental retardation is
now defined as "(1) an IQ below 70-75, (2) concurrently existing with
limitations in two or more adaptive skill areas, (3) which is mani-
fested by age eighteen."' 7 Diagnosis of mental retardation will result
from a person's performance on IQ tests and an analysis of function-
ing in ten sets of behavior skills. 18 These ten sets are communication,
self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work.' 9 Under
this definition, environmental factors and mental health support play a
significant role.20 Two of the three criteria from the 1983 definition
remain intact: there must be significant sub-average intellectual func-
tioning, and mental retardation must manifest before age eighteen.
However, the criterion for adaptive behavior has been greatly ex-
panded. The AAMR had found that the previous adaptive behavior
standard was too difficult to conceive and to measure.21 By clarifying
this definition into ten skill areas, the concept of mental retardation
was better understood by lay people and more firmly grounded.22
The AAMR has developed a "Profile and Intensities of Needed
Supports" that describes the different levels of support a mentally re-
14 Id. at 11.
15 Id.
16 New York and South Dakota are the two states that do not use a definition. See N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12) (McKinney 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1 (Mi-
chie 2002).
17 Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from Capital Punishment: State
Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOc. CHANGE,
59, 67-70 (1996) (laying out the historical development of the definition of mental retardation
used by the AAMR). For additional discussion of the AAMR definition of mental retardation,
see AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINI-
TION, CLASSIFICATION AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORT 5 (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR DEFINI-
TION]; Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting
the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death
Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911,915 (2001); William K. Wetzonis, Capital Punishment for Men-
tally Retarded Defendants: A Boundary for the Eighth Amendment Is Drawn, 34 HOW. L.J.
651, 655 (1991) (contrasting definitions of "mental disorder" with "mental retardation."); John
J. Gruttadaurio, Note, Consistency in the Application of the Death Penalty to Juveniles and the
Mentally Impaired: A Suggested Legislative Approach, 58 U. CN. L. REV. 211, 234 (1989)
(discussing the older AAMR definition of mental retardation).
18 Bing, supra note 17, at 69.
'9 Id. at 69 n.53.
20 Id. at 69.
21 Id. at 70.
22 id.
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tarded person may require. These levels of support are intermittent,
limited, extensive, and pervasive.23 Intermittent support is provided
for an individual who requires support on an as-needed basis, such as
the loss of a job. Although the support is episodic in nature, it may be
of high or low intensity. Limited support is support that is consis-
tently required over a limited span of time. Extensive support in-
volves regular involvement at home or work on a long-term basis.
Finally, pervasive support is defined as constant, high-intensity sup-
port across all areas of life and may include life-sustaining meas-
ures.
2 4
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV) has a very similar, although not identical definition. Men-
tal retardation is defined as "significantly subaverage general intellec-
tual functioning" 25 accompanied by "significant limitations in adap-
tive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: commu-
nication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of
community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills,
work, leisure, health and safety' 26 that must manifest itself by the
time the person is eighteen years of age.27
The first prong, significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning, is based on IQ scores that are obtained through the use of
standardized intelligence tests. The majority of people in the United
States have IQs between 80 and 120, with an IQ of 100 considered
average. 28 DSM-IV rates the following IQ scores as indicative of
mental retardation:
IQ 50-55 to approximately 70: mild mental retardation
IQ 35-40 to 50-55: moderate mental retardation
IQ 20-25 to 35-40: severe mental retardation
IQ below 20: profound mental retardation.29
Of the 2-3% of the population that is mentally retarded, 85% are
mildly retarded, 10% are moderately retarded, 3-4% are severely re-
tarded, and 1-2% are profoundly retarded. 30 This definition also rec-
23 AAMR DEFINITION, supra note 17, at 26.
2 id.
2 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 39 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. See also Tran v. State, 66
S.W.3d 790, 795 (Tenn. 2001) (discussing the DSM-IV definition of mental retardation and the
scale used to determine the degree of mental retardation).
26 DSM-IV, supra note 25, at 39.
27 id.
28 Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty and Offenders with Mental Retardation, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, Vol. 13, No. I(G) (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/200l/ustat/
[hereinafter Mental Retardation Website].
29 DSM-IV, supra note 25, at 40.
30 Id. at 41-42.
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ognizes that individuals with an IQ of 71 to 75 may also be mentally
retarded if they have significant deficits in adaptive functioning.
31
The second prong of this definition, adaptive functioning skills,
is defined as "the presenting symptoms in individuals with Mental
Retardation. 32 This refers to how effectively individuals cope with
common life demands and how well they meet the standards of inde-
pendence expected of someone in their age group, socio-cultural
background, and community setting.33 Mildly retarded people "can
reach sixth-grade level by [their] late teens, and as... adult[s] need[]
supervision and guidance under 'unusual' social or economic
stress. 3 n In comparison, people who are considered moderately re-
tarded are "unlikely to progress beyond a second-grade academic
level. 35 These individuals may attend to their own personal care and
perform unskilled or semi-skilled work under supervision. However,
during adolescence, they may have difficulty recognizing social con-
ventions, which may interfere with peer relationships. 36 Those who
are severely retarded "may learn to talk during the school-age period
and may be trained in elementary self-care skills. 37 Those who are
profoundly retarded display considerable impairments that require
38
constant care in a structured setting.
Finally, mental retardation is also present from childhood. Such
factors as poor prenatal care, infections during pregnancy, physical
abuse, and malnutrition are causes of this disease.39 In other words,
an ordinary adult cannot suddenly become mentally retarded. In addi-
tion, mental retardation is permanent. While a mentally retarded per-
son can be taught skills and strategies that will enable him or her to
function better in society, he or she cannot be "cured" by psychother-
apy or medication. n
The above discussion regarding the definitions of mental retarda-
tion and the effects of this condition seems to suggest that juveniles
and the mentally retarded share many characteristics. Many mentally
retarded people "have limited communication skills, poor impulse
control, and underdeveloped conception of blameworthiness, a denial
31 See id. at 45.
32 Id. at 40.
33 id.
34 Gruttadaurio, supra note 17, at 233 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d. ed. 1980) (footnotes
omitted).
35 id.
36 Entzeroth, supra note 17, at 914.
37 Id.
31 Id. at914-15.
39 id.
40 Id. at916.
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of their disability, a lack of knowledge of basic facts, and increased
susceptibility to the influence of authority figures.' Similarly, many
juveniles are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-
disciplined than adults, and are without the same capacity to control
their conduct and to think in long-range terms. They are particularly
impressionable, subject to peer pressure, and lack experience, per-
spective, and judgment.42 The presence of these similar characteris-
tics in the mental development of juveniles and the mentally retarded
add credibility to the claim that both groups should be treated consis-
tently when it comes to the death penalty.
II. HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY SINCE FURMAN
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution bans
the use of cruel and unusual punishment. It states: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted., 43 In Trop v. Dulles,44 the Court de-
scribed the history behind this phrase:
The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly from the
English Declaration of Rights of 1688, and the principle it
represents can be traced back to the Magna Carta. The basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to
punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be
exercised within the limits of civilized standards. Fines, im-
prisonment and even execution may be imposed depending
upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the
bounds of these traditional penalties is considered constitu-
tionally suspect.45
The framers of the Constitution were worried primarily about tor-
ture and barbarous methods of punishment.46
A. Furman v. Georgia
In the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia,47 the Supreme Court
held that the death penalty, as it was administered at that time, was
41 Bing, supra note 17, at 72.
42 Mirah A. Horowitz, Note, Kids Who Kill Kids: A Critique of How the American Legal
System Deals with Juveniles Who Commit Homicide, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2000,
at 133, 165.
43 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
44 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
41 Id. at 100.
46 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976).
4' 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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cruel and unusual punishment. Justices Brennan and Marshall
thought that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional.48 Justices
Douglas, Stewart, and White did not hold the death penalty unconsti-
tutional per se, but they did vote to strike down capital punishment on
other grounds. These justices stated that unguided discretionary sen-
tencing violated the Eighth Amendment because it was "pregnant
with discrimination,"'49 it permitted the death penalty "to be so wan-
tonly and so freakishly imposed,' 50 and it led to the death penalty's
being "exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious
crimes [with] no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.",51 In a
case in which every justice wrote his own opinion, Justices Douglas',
Stewart's, and White's rationales have been what other courts and the
Supreme Court have taken as the central holdings of Furman.
In 1976, the Court decided that the punishment of death was not
52inappropriate for the crime of murder under all circumstances. This
decision was made because, after Furman, "[t]he legislatures of at
least 35 States enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty
for at least some crimes that result in the death of another person.
In addition, "[a]t the close of 1974, at least 254 persons had been sen-
tenced to death since Furman, and by the end of March 1976, more
than 460 persons were subject to death sentences. 54
B. The Post-Furman Rules
Beginning with Furman, the Court has provided standards for a
constitutional death penalty that "serve both goals of measured, con-
sistent application and fairness to the accused. ' 55 Furman stands for
the principle that the death penalty requires guided jury discretion and
a narrowing of the class of those eligible to receive it. Most of the
states that enacted new death penalty statutes attempted to address
48 Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating "the punishment of death is inconsistent
with all four principles: Death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a
strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary society is virtually
total; and there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than the
less severe punishment of imprisonment."). id. at 370 n.163 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating
that "[tihere is too much crime, too much killing, too much hatred in this country. If the legisla-
ture could eradicate these elements from our lives by utilizing capital punishment, then there
would be a valid purpose for the sanction and the public would surely accept it.... What pur-
pose has it served? The evidence is that it has served none.").
49 Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
50 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
52 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
13 Id. at 179-80.
54 Id. at 182.
55 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111 (1982).
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these problems in either one of two ways: (1) "by making the death
penalty mandatory for specified crimes,"56 or (2) "by specifying the
factors to be weighed and the procedures to be followed in deciding
when to impose a capital sentence.
In Woodson v. North Carolina,58 the Court considered the first
proposal: mandatory death sentences for certain crimes. In striking
down this type of law, the Court stated that "'individual culpability is
not always measured by the category of the crime committed."' 59
Instead, capital cases "require[] consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particu-
lar offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of
inflicting the penalty of death."6 North Carolina's mandatory death
penalty statute still encompassed the problems Furman sought to al-
leviate. Although the statute narrowed the class of people eligible to
receive the death penalty, it did not provide any standards to guide the
jury "in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which first-
degree murderers shall live and which shall die. And there is no way
... for the judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious exercise of that
power through a review of death sentences." 61
Other death penalty statutes have attempted to alleviate the prob-
lems addressed in Furman through a second proposal: requiring ju-
ries to find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigat-
ing factors. Aggravating circumstances are those factors that differ-
entiate the capital defendant's crime from crimes that are not punish-
able by death. They increase the enormity of the crime, which singles
it out for harsher treatment.62 Mitigating factors are those things that
do not excuse or justify the offense, but which in "fairness and
mercy" should be considered as reducing the degree of moral culpa-
16 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 180.
57 Id.
58 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
59 Id. at 298 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing)).
60 Id. at 304.
61 Id. at 303. See also (Harry) Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977) (per cu-
riam) (stating that "[b]ecause the Louisiana statute does not allow for consideration of particu-
larized mitigating factors, it is unconstitutional" in the case of a mandatory death penalty statute
where there was first-degree murder of a police officer engaged in the course of his duties);
(Stanislaus) Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1976) (stating "[t]his responsive ver-
dict procedure not only lacks standards to guide the jury in selecting among first-degree mur-
derers, but it plainly invites jurors to disregard their oaths and choose a verdict for a lesser of-
fense whenever they feel the death penalty is inappropriate"). But see id. at 334 n.9 ("Although
even this narrow category does not permit the jury to consider possible mitigating factors, a
prisoner serving a life sentence presents a unique problem that may justify such a law.").
62 RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 329 (2d ed. 2001).
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bility.63 The Court has recognized that in "the determination of sen-
tences, justice requires . . . that there be taken into account the cir-
cumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities
of the offender." 64 However, the Court has also realized that jurors
cannot properly use the information given to them in the sentencing
stage of the trial without adequate guidance.65  In Lockett v. Ohio,
the Court concluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death., 67  Not only is the sentencer not precluded from considering
any mitigating factor, he or she is required to give it some weight in
their consideration.68
C. Age and Mental Retardation As Mitigating Factors
Both age and mental retardation are mitigating factors the jury
should take into consideration when deciding to sentence someone to
death. In Eddings v. Oklahoma,69 the Court considered age as a miti-
gating factor. It stated that "youth is more than a chronological fact.
It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most suscepti-
ble to influence and to psychological damage.... Particularly 'during
the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack
63 Id. at 389 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 903 (5th ed. 1979)).
64 Pennsylvania ex reL Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).
65 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976):
But the provision of relevant information under fair procedural rules is
not alone sufficient to guarantee that the information will be properly
used in the imposition of punishment, especially if sentencing is per-
formed by a jury. Since the members of a jury will have had little, if
any, previous experience in sentencing, they are unlikely to be skilled in
dealing with the information they are given.... It seems clear, however,
that the problem will be alleviated if the jury is given guidance regarding
the factors about the crime and the defendant that the State, representing
the organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing deci-
sion.
66 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
67 Id. at 604. The Court went on to say that a statute that does not afford the sentencer the
opportunity to give independent weight to mitigating factors "creates the risk that the death
penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the
choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 605. But see California v. Brown, 479 U.S.
538, 539 (1987) (upholding an instruction informing jurors that they "must not be swayed by
mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling").
68 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982) (stating that the trial court may
determine the weight it would like to give mitigating evidence, "[blut [it] may not give it no
weight by excluding such evidence from [its] consideration").
69 Id.
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the experience, perspective, and judgment' expected of adults., 70 The
Court cautioned that it was not suggesting an absence of responsibil-
ity for crimes committed by minors, only that the offender's status as
a minor should count as a mitigating factor.7'
Six years later the Court decided at what age executing a child
violates the Eighth Amendment. Thompson v. Oklahoma72 banned
the execution of juveniles under the age of sixteen.73 One rationale
behind this rule was that no state allowed a child under that age to be
executed.74 The Court explained that "[a]dolescents, particularly in
the early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive,
and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths
may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older per-
sons, but they deserve less punishment." 75 A year later, the Court
held that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment to execute juveniles
over the age of sixteen.76 It again looked to the number of states that
permitted capital punishment for juveniles over sixteen years old:
"Of the 37 States whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 declined
to impose it upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to impose it
on 17-year-old offenders. This does not establish the degree of na-
tional consensus this Court has previously thought sufficient to label a
particular punishment cruel and unusual."7 7 Since 1973, there have
70 Id. at 115-16 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)). The Court also
quoted the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders
when it stated "youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, which share responsibil-
ity for the development of America's youth." Id. at 115 n. 11.
71 Id. at 116.
72 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
71 Id. at 838.
74 Id. at 824.
75 ld. at 834 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.l I (1982)). But see id.
at 865-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (discussing the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984 that lowered the age juveniles can be tried as adults from sixteen to fifteen
because "in 1979 alone juveniles under the age of 15, i.e., almost a year younger than Thomp-
son, had committed a total of 206 homicides nationwide, more than 1000 forcible rapes, 10,000
robberies, and 10,000 aggravated assaults."); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 734 n.4 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("Minors who become embroiled with the law range from the very
young up to those on the brink of majority. Some of the older minors become fully 'street-
wise,' hardened criminals, deserving no greater consideration than that properly accorded all
persons suspected of crime.").
76 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). But see Patterson v. Texas, Nos. 02-6010,
02-6017, 2002 LEXIS 5341 (August 28, 2002) (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, J.J., dissenting
from denial of stay) (arguing that Stanford should be reconsidered in light of the Atkins case).
77 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71; cf Eddings, 455 U.S. 104; Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 154 (1987); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (discussing the definition of national consen-
sus).
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been 200 juveniles sentenced to death, and seventeen have been exe-
cuted.78
The same year the Court held that executing a juvenile over the
age of sixteen was constitutional, it also decided Penry v. Lynaugh,79
a 5-4 decision that held that executing the mentally retarded did not
violate the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment. 80  Justice O'Connor, the swing-vote, stated that although
mental retardation is a factor that can diminish an individual's culpa-
bility for a criminal act, mental retardation alone was not sufficient
for a person to lack the culpability necessary for the death penalty:
On the record before the Court today, however, I cannot con-
clude that all mentally retarded people of Penry's ability-by
virtue of their mental retardation alone, and apart from any
individualized consideration of their personal responsibility-
inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity
to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death
penalty. Mentally retarded persons are individuals whose
abilities and experiences can vary greatly .... In addition to
the varying degrees of mental retardation, the consequences
of a retarded person's mental impairment, including the defi-
cits in his or her adaptive behavior, "may be ameliorated
through education and habilitation." 81
In addition, the Court stated that there was "insufficient evidence
of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded people
convicted of capital offenses. 82 At the time, only one state banned
this type of execution.
83
In 2002, the Supreme Court overruled Penry when it held that
executing the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment's
78 Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Executions
for Juvenile Crimes Jan 1, 1973-December 31,2000, at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/
juvdeath.htm [hereinafter Juveniles Death Penalty Website].
7' 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 338 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson,
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 424 n.54 (1985)). It is
interesting that the Court's rationale focused on the fact that mentally retarded individuals vary
in their abilities when it refused to exclude them from the death penalty. When the Court de-
cided Thompson, it focused on juveniles as a class and made broad generalizations about their
abilities. It seems as if the Court in Thompson ignored the fact that the generalizations used to
describe juveniles may not apply to each individual. Because of the similar characteristics in
both classes, the Court should have considered the mentally retarded as a class, not each defen-
dant individually.
12 Id. at 335.
83 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (1990 & Supp. 1994). Maryland had enacted a similar
statute, but it did not take effect until after the Penry decision was announced. See MD. CODE
ANN., art.27 § 412(f)(1) (1992).
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prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. s4  The Court
reached this decision by concluding that such a practice violated the
currently prevailing standards of decency. 85 In the thirteen years
since Penry was decided, a significant number of states, sixteen, had
concluded that the death penalty was not a suitable punishment for the
mentally retarded,86 and similar bills had passed in at least one house
87in a number of other states. However, the Court stated that it was
not only the number of states that have prohibited this practice that
was significant, but also the consistency of the change and the fact
that, even in states that allowed this type of punishment, it was un-
common:
Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far
more popular than legislation providing protections for per-
sons guilty of violent crimes the large number of States pro-
hibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the
complete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the
power to conduct such executions) provides powerful evi-
dence that today our society views mentally retarded offend-
ers as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.
The evidence carries even greater force when it is noted that
the legislatures that have addressed the issue have voted
overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition. Moreover, even
in those States that allow the execution of mentally retarded
offenders, the practice is uncommon.88
In addition, the Court reasoned that, because of the deficiencies
associated with mental retardation, the execution of these defendants
are not justified by either retribution or deterrence, the two justifica-
tions for the death penalty.89 Finally, there is a special risk of wrong-
ful execution because of the increased possibility of false confessions;
the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive
showing of mitigation, give meaningful assistance to their counsel, or
be good witnesses; and the fact that their demeanor may create an
unwarranted impression of a lack of remorse for their crimes.90 The
8 Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002).
" Id. at 2248-2250.
86 id.
" See S. 497, 2002 Leg., 95th Sess. (Va. 2002); H.R. 236, 77th Leg., 353d Sess. (Tex.
2001); Assemb. 353, 236 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2001); H.R. 236, 77th Legis., 236th Sess.
(Tex. 2001). In addition, a commission on capital punishment in Illinois recommended that the
state should adopt a statute prohibiting executing the mentally retarded. State of Ill., REPORT OF
THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 156 (2002).88 Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2249.
89 Id. at 2250-52 (discussing diminished culpability because of impaired ability to reason
logically, learn from experience, and control impulses).
90 Id. at 2252.
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Court also noted that there is disagreement about how to determine
which defendants are mentally retarded but stated that it would leave
that task up to the states. 91 From 1976 to 2002, there have been
thirty-five executions of people who are mentally retarded.92
III. THE TEST FOR CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The test used to determine whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual, and the rationale the Court used to hold that executing juve-
niles under the age of sixteen violates the Eighth Amendment, pro-
vides further proof that executing the mentally retarded is cruel and
unusual punishment. The Supreme Court established a three-step test
in Gregg v. Georgia93 to determine if a punishment violates the
Eighth Amendment. For a punishment to pass muster under this test,
the following must occur: First, the punishment must not be one that
was considered a "'barbarous' method[] that [was] generally out-
lawed in the 18th century." 94 Second, "[lthe Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." 95 Finally, the punishment must not
be excessive. 96 The inquiry into excessiveness requires a further two-
step analysis. First, "the punishment must not involve the unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain," 97 and second, "the punishment
must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. 98
A. Generally Outlawed in the Eighteenth Century
The first step in analyzing whether a particular punishment is
prohibited because it violates the Eighth Amendment is to evaluate
whether the punishment was outlawed in the eighteenth century. An-
other way of stating this is to decide whether the punishment is one of
"those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel
and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted." 99 The
phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" first appeared in the English
Bill of Rights of 1689, which was drafted by Parliament after the Glo-
rious Revolution. Parliament was called into session to draft general
statements containing such things that were "absolutely necessary to
9' Id. at 2250.
92 Mental Retardation Website, supra note 28.
9' 428 U.S. 153, 171-73 (1976).94 /d. at 171.
95 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). This sentence was also quoted in Gregg, so it
is still considered part of the Gregg test that seemed to synthesize different elements of a cruel
and unusual test. See 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
96 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
97 Id. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
98 Id.
99 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405 (1986).
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be considered for the better securing of... religion, laws and liber-
ties."' ° This phrase appears to have been directed at punishments
unauthorized by statute, beyond the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court, and disproportionate to the offense involved.10 The language
used in the American Bill of Rights was drawn verbatim from the
English Bill of Rights. Similar to the English rationale, the American
drafters were primarily concerned with prohibiting tortures and other
barbarous methods of punishment.10 2 The history behind this phrase
provides proof that the framers intended to provide at least the same
protections as its English counterpart, if not an intention to go beyond
those protections.1
0 3
B. Evolving Standards of Decency
The second step in the cruel and unusual analysis is whether
evolving standards of decency would prohibit this type of punish-
ment. The Eighth Amendment "has been interpreted in a flexible and
dynamic manner.''] 4  Therefore, the meaning of the provision
changes and "may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice.' 0 5  In order to determine if the
evolving standards of decency have changed, the Court must look to
objective criteria that reflect the public's current attitude towards the
death penalty. 1°6 There are two objective criteria that the Court has
decided accurately reflect the public's attitude: first, the "statutes
[are] passed by society's representatives,"' 1 7 and second, "the reluc-
tance of juries to impose, and prosecutors to seek, such sentences."'0 8
'0 Furman, 408 U.S. at 318 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Anthony F. Granucci, Nor
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 854
(1969)).
101 Granucci, supra note 100, at 860.
'02 id. at842n.17.
103 Ford, 477 U.S. at 406. See also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) ("Although
the Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of its English
counterpart, their use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they
intended to provide at least the same protection."). See supra Part 1 for a discussion of the
Eighth Amendment history.
104 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976). The Court went on'to say that it "early
recognized that 'a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth."' Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). See also
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S 86, 103 (1958) ("The provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn
adages or hollow shibboleths").
'o Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
'06 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
'07 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "in a democratic society legislatures, not
the courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the peo-
ple").
'0' Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373. Justice Scalia went on to state that "the very considerations
which induce petitioners and their supporters to believe that death should never be imposed on
20021
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
In the past, the Court has evaluated what constitutes a national
consensus in different ways. However, at no point has the Court "set
a minimum number of states needed to present a consensus." 1°9 In at
least three cases, the Court has acknowledged the existence of a na-
tional consensus when there was unanimity or virtual unanimity
among the states. In Coker v. Georgia,I ° the Court held that execut-
ing a person for the rape of an adult woman is cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.'11 Only three states provided for the death penalty in this
situation, and two of those statutes had been held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court. 1 2 In Ford v. Wainwright,' 3 the Court held that
executing someone who had become insane after trial was cruel and
unusual punishment when no state permitted this type of execution.14
In Thompson, the Court found that executing a juvenile under the age
of sixteen was unconstitutional."15 The rationale supporting this deci-
sion was that "[w]hen [the Court] confine[d] [its] attention to the 18
States that have expressly established a minimum age in their death
penalty statutes, [it found] that all of them require that the defendant
have attained the age of 16 at the time of the capital offense."' 16 A
year later, the Court found that when fifteen states out of thirty-six
states that authorize the death penalty refuse to impose it upon six-
teen-year-olds, this was not enough to establish a national consen-
sus.
117
In light of the above holdings, it would appear that a very high
number of states, considerably more than a majority, must agree in
order for a national consensus to be established. However, in Atkins,
when eighteen out of thirty-eight states that had the death penalty
(thirty out of fifty states total) did not allow the execution of the men-
tally retarded, this was enough to establish a national consensus." 8 In
addition, there appears to be a question regarding whether the Court
offenders under 18 cause prosecutors and juries to believe that it should rarely be imposed." Id.
at 374. It has been argued that this passage proves that the majority in Stanford did not believe
the use of jury sentences was sufficient evidence to determine a national consensus. Bing, supra
note 17, at 103. For purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that jury sentences are sufficient
evidence. See also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 ("The jury also is a significant and reliable objective
index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved.").
109 Bing, supra note 17, at 105.
"0 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 594. Louisiana and North Carolina had provided for this type of execution. Rob-
erts and Woodson, respectively, found these statues to be unconstitutional. Roberts v. Louisi-
ana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
"' 477 U.S. 399 (1986).114 Id. at 408- 10.
"' 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
116 Id. at 829 (emphasis added).
II? Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989).
118 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002).
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considers those states that have outlawed the death penalty altogether.
Justice Scalia has argued that those states should not be considered,119
while Justice O'Connor believes those states should be included in
the analysis.
120
Not only is there a question of whether states that do not have
the death penalty should be included in determining whether there is a
national consensus, but there is also a question of what role, if any,
other nations should play in determining the evolving standards of
decency. The Court has looked to international practices in many
other death penalty cases: "Indeed, in assessing the contemporary
standards of 'humanity,' this Court has consistently recognized the
obvious fact that 'humanity' encompasses citizens of nations other
than our own."'121 The Court has even looked to other nations, par-
ticularly those with similar legal and social traditions, in other con-
texts. 122  Because of increasing globalization, "the opinions of other
nations are more relevant today than at any time since the Found-
ing."'123 However, at least one justice, Justice Scalia, does not think
the opinion of other nations is relevant. 24
C. Excessive and Unnecessary
The final step in the cruel and unusual analysis examines
whether executing the mentally retarded is excessive. 25  A punish-
ment is considered excessive when it is unnecessary: "The infliction
of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dig-
"19 See Stanford, 492 U.S at 370-71 n.2 (stating that it is illogical to include those states
that do not have capital punishment because they do not address the specific issues that are in
question).
120 See Linda Greenhouse, Top Court Hears Argument on Execution of Retarded, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2002, at A21; see also Bing, supra note 17, at 104 (arguing that those states
should be included in a national consensus computation).
121 Brief for Amici Curiae Diplomats Morton Abramowitz, et al. at 7, McCarver v. North
Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
ForeignServiceBrief.html [hereinafter Amici Brief]. See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (looking to international practices to determine that the death penalty was
unconstitutional); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986) (stating that "the natural ab-
horrence civilized societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own
conscious or deity is still vivid today"); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 n.22 (1982)
(stating that "the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in England and India, severely
restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in conti-
nental Europe"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (looking at international practices
regarding the death penalty for rape); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (looking to inter-
national opinion to access "evolving standards of decency" for the Eighth Amendment).
122 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101-02 (stating that "since the founding of the nation, this Court
has, in non-Eighth Amendment contexts, often noted that Americans' social values reflect and
are informed by those of other nations.").
123 Amici Brief, supra note 121 at 7.
'2 See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2264 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
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nity when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffer-
ing. '  In addition, if there is a significantly less severe punishment
that would achieve the same purpose for which the punishment was
inflicted, then the punishment inflicted is excessive. 27  However, a
punishment will not be found excessive if a two-step analysis is met:
(1) the punishment serves some valid peneological purpose, and (2)
the punishment is not "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime. ' ' 128
1. Valid Peneological Purpose
The first step in the excessiveness analysis is whether executing
the mentally retarded serves any peneological purpose. The Supreme
Court has stated that the death penalty serves two peneological pur-
poses: deterrence and retribution.1 29  Deterrence occurs when the
punishment of one person discourages that person 130 or another per-
son 131 from committing a crime.1 32 This theory of punishment "rests
on the assumption that the rational actor will conform his conduct to a
socially acceptable standard because the potential costs of unaccept-
able activities outweigh the potential benefits.' 33  In other words, it
assumes the offender will perform a cost-benefit analysis.
The second peneological purpose that is served by the death pen-
alty is retribution. This theory has two components: (1) the death
penalty punishes "conduct that is so egregious, so violative of socially
acceptable standards of behavior, that it merits the severest of penal-
ties," 1 34 and (2) the death penalty expresses "society's moral outrage"
at the conduct. 35  "Retribution involves punishing the criminal be-
cause he deserves to be punished. Culpability is crucial .... ,,136 Ap-
126 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
127 Id.
128 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. Justice Stewart also concluded that the "sanction imposed
cannot be so totally without peneological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of
suffering." Id. at 183. See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("Under Gregg, a
punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime.").
129 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
130 This type of deterrence is called specific deterrence.
13 1 This type of deterrence is called general deterrence.
132 Jamie Marie Billotte, Is It Justified?: The Death Penalty and Mental Retardation, 8
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 333, 341 (1994).
133 Philip L. Fetzer, Execution of the Mentally Retarded: A Punishment Without Justifica-
tion, 40 S.C. L. REV. 419,439 (1989).
134 Id. at 440.
135 id.
136 Billotte, supra note 132, at 363. Justice Stewart stated that "[r]etribution is no longer
the dominant objective of criminal law" but it does serve as an expression of society's moral
outrage. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
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propriateness of this punishment is a question of "personal responsi-
bility and moral guilt,' 13 7 which is determined by the mental state of
the defendant.
13 8
2. Proportionality
The second step of the excessiveness analysis examines whether
executing the mentally retarded is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime. The constitutional principle of proportionality
states that the "punishment should be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal defendant."' 139  This principle takes into
account not only the injury to the victim and public caused by the
crime, but also the moral depravity of the offender.14° After weighing
all the mitigating evidence, a court must rule that the punishment is
disproportionate if the severity outweighs the defendant's individual
culpability.
141
D. Juveniles and the Cruel and Unusual Test
Executing juveniles below the age of sixteen violates the Eighth
Amendment. In order to advance the argument that the Supreme
Court should treat groups with similar characteristics in a consistent
manner, it is necessary to evaluate why this punishment is cruel and
unusual. There was no prohibition against executing juveniles when
the Bill of Rights was enacted. At that time, "the common law set the
rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit any felony at the age
of 14, and theoretically permitted capital punishment to be imposed
on anyone over the age of 7.''142 In 1642, the first juvenile, Thomas
Graunger, a sixteen-year-old of the Plymouth Colony, was exe-
cuted. 14 3 Since that date, at least 279 juvenile offenders have been
executed. 44 Therefore, the execution of juveniles is not cruel and
unusual punishment based on the first prong of the test.
137 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
138 See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (citing Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978) for the proposition that a defendant's mental state is critical to assessing defendant's
culpability).
139 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293 (1983) (stating that the culpability of the offender is an im-
portant principle in determining proportionality of a punishment).
140 Kathleen A. Strottman, Note, Creating a Downward Spiral: Transfer Statutes and
Rebuttable Presumptions as Answers to Juvenile Delinquency, 19 WHrITIER L. REV. 707, 743
(1998).
141 Id.
142 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989).
143 VIcrOR L. STREB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 55 (1987).
144 Id.
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Because executing juveniles was an acceptable punishment dur-
ing the eighteenth century, the analysis must progress to the second
prong of the test: whether the evolving standards of decency have
evolved so that executing juveniles is now considered cruel and un-
usual punishment. As was stated above,145 executing juveniles was
outlawed by Thompson v. Oklahoma. The Court found that the stan-
dards of decency have evolved to the extent that executing someone
under the age of sixteen does violate the Eighth Amendment. How-
ever, objective indicators regarding the evolving standards of decency
of executing juveniles have changed since the Thompson ruling.
Even though the Supreme Court has held that no one under the age of
sixteen can be executed, 146 violent crimes committed by juveniles in
the United States have increased dramatically. 147 One in six murder
arrests are of juveniles, and the age of those arrested gets younger
every year.148  For example, in 1999, two eleven-year-olds were
charged with the murder of their father and the attempted murder of
their mother and sister.149 In addition, a public opinion poll has re-
vealed that approximately 73% of Americans believe that juveniles
who commit violent crimes should be charged as adults, 150 and 72%
of Americans believe those juveniles should receive the death pen-
alty.151
States have reacted to this increase in violent crimes committed
by juveniles by adopting a "get-tough" approach. This approach has
resulted in three different types of responses to teen violence. First,
many states have lowered the age at which juveniles can be trans-
ferred to adult criminal court.1 52 The traditional method of transfer-
ring juveniles to adult court is called judicial waiver. This "involves a
process whereby a statute empowers a juvenile court judge with the
145 See supra Part l.C.
146 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1998).
147 See Horowitz, supra note 42, at 134 (stating that between "the mid 1980s and the mid
1990s, the number of youths committing homicides had increased by 168%").
148 Id. In North Carolina in 1997, seventy juveniles were arrested on murder charges.
Thirty-five were seventeen, twenty-four were sixteen, seven were fifteen, and four were be-
tween the ages of thirteen and fourteen. Id.
149 id.
150 Kelly Keimig Elsea, The Juvenile Crime Debate: Rehabilitation, Punishment, or Pre-
vention, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135, 136 (1995).
151 Strottman, supra note 140, at 709. In addition, some politicians have advocated for a
decrease in the age of juveniles subjected to the death penalty. Horowitz, supra note 42, at 150-
51.
152 Irene Merker Rosenberg, Teen Violence and the Juvenile Courts: A Plea for Reflection
and Restraint, 37 Hous. L. REV. 75, 79 (2000). See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-518 (1999)
(allowing waiver at 12 years of age for certain crimes); FLA. STAT. ch. 985.225(1) (2002) (al-
lowing a waiver at any age for a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment).
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discretion whether to transfer a case or not."'153 The judge is given
discretion to determine whether a particular juvenile can be rehabili-
tated in the juvenile system or should be tried as an adult because his
or her offense requires a harsher punishment than can be provided in
the juvenile system.154 The discretion of the judge is limited only by
United States v. Kent,'" which states that a juvenile is entitled to a
waiver hearing, representation by counsel, access to information upon
which the waiver decision was to be based, and a statement of the
reasons justifying the waiver decision. 156 However, some states have
determined that this type of waiver gives the judge too much discre-
tion. This leads to the second response to juvenile violence: prosecu-
torial or statutory waiver laws. 57 Prosecutorial waiver occurs when
the district attorney selects the juveniles who will be prosecuted in
criminal court.'58 Statutory waiver is when the legislature makes the
determination of who will be transferred to criminal court "by auto-
matically excluding children of a certain age charged with specified
offenses from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court."'' 59 Finally, some
states have responded to juvenile violence by focusing more on pun-
ishment and retribution in the juvenile court system, instead of only
rehabilitation. 160
Although many states have created more ways to transfer and
lowered the age at which juveniles may be transferred to adult crimi-
nal court, and some politicians have advocated a decrease in the age
at which juveniles may be given the death penalty,' 6' no state has up-
held this punishment for any child under the age of sixteen. What this
proves is that while states are more willing to hold juveniles account-
able for their violent crimes, they still do not believe those offenders
should be subjected to the death penalty. 162 While juveniles are being
held more accountable for their actions, they are still perceived as
different than their adult counterparts.
153 Katherine L. Evans, Comment, Trying Juveniles as Adults: Is the Short Term Gain of
Retribution Outweighed by the Long Term Effects on Society?, 62 Miss. L.J. 95, 101 (1992).
"4 Id. at 101-02.
' 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
156 Id. at 542.
157 Merker Rosenberg, supra note 152, at 81.
158 id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 85. Many states have amended the purposes section of their juvenile codes to
emphasize that juveniles should be punished and incarcerated, de-emphasizing rehabilitation as
a goal. Other states have adopted determinate sentencing in juvenile courts so that the sentence
depends on the severity of the crime. Id.
161 Horowitz, supra note 42, at 150-5 1.
162 See Patterson v. Texas, Nos. 02-6010, 02-6017, 2002 LEXIS 5341 (August 28, 2002)
(Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., dissenting from denial of stay) (arguing that the execution of
juveniles over the age of sixteen should be reconsidered in light of the Atkins case).
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This leads to the third prong of the cruel and unusual test: ex-
cessiveness. Because juveniles are less culpable than adults are, exe-
cuting them serves no valid peneological purpose. Juveniles are less
able to exercise choice freely and rationally. As stated in Thompson
v. Oklahoma,'63 "[t]he likelihood that the teenage offender has made
the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possi-
bility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent."'164 Ju-
veniles are different than adults. They often believe that they are in-
vincible, and because of this, they are more willing to take risks that
endanger themselves and others.165 In addition, a juvenile's ability to
use reason when making decisions is not as developed as an adult's
ability: "'They are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-
disciplined than adults,' and are without the same 'capacity to control
their conduct and to think in long-range terms.', 166 Therefore, be-
cause of the characteristics of youth, the deterrence theory of punish-
ment is not served.
Executing juveniles also does not serve the retributive theory of
punishment. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "'[c]rimes com-
mitted by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those commit-
ted by older persons, but they deserve less punishment because ado-
lescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think
in long-range terms than adults." ' 167 They are not capable of acting
with the degree of culpability necessary to justify the death penalty.
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the
teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her
conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to
be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an
adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the
privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why
their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as
that of an adult.1
68
Because of this lack of culpability, executing juveniles does not
serve the legitimate peneological purpose of retribution. Because nei-
ther valid purpose of punishment is served by executing juveniles and
culpability is a necessary element of proportionality, the death penalty
' 487 U.S. 815 (1985).
'64 Id. at 837.
165 Horowitz, supra note 42, at 165.
166 Id. (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
'67 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n. 1 (1982) (quoting TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING
YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978)).
16' Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
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will be disproportionate to the crimes juveniles commit. As a result,
capital punishment is reduced to "purposeless and needless imposi-
tion of pain and suffering."' 69  Executing juveniles is against the
evolving standards of decency and serves no purpose of punishment.
It violates the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and un-
usual punishment.
E. The Mentally Retarded and the Cruel and Unusual Test
Because executing juveniles is considered cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, the rationales that were used to determine this outcome
should be applied to and compared with the issues surrounding the
execution of the mentally retarded. As with juveniles, when the Bill
of Rights was adopted, there was no per se prohibition against execut-
ing the mentally retarded. Instead, "idiots" and "lunatics" were not
held liable for their criminal activities.170 Idiocy was defined as "'a
defect of understanding from the moment of birth,"' 171 and lunacy
was "'a partial derangement of the intellectual faculties, the senses
returning at uncertain intervals. ' , 172 This prohibition against execut-
ing "idiots" and "lunatics" for criminal acts was the precursor to the
insanity defense. This defense includes mental defects and mental
disease in the definition of legal insanity. 173 The definition of "idiots"
has some similarity to the definition of mental retardation. 74  As
stated in Penry,
The common law prohibition against punishing "idiots" gen-
erally applied . . . to persons of such severe disability that
they lacked the reasoning capacity to form criminal intent or
to understand the difference between good and evil. In the
19th and early 2 0 th centuries, the term "idiot" was used to de-
scribe the most retarded of persons, corresponding to what is
called "profound" and "severe" retardation.
75
Although the term "mentally retarded" was not used, it seems that
the general prohibition against punishing "idiots" and "lunatics" may
169 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
170 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). Blackstone stated that "'idiots and luna-
tics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these incapacities: no, not
even for treason itself.... [A] total idiocy, or absolute insanity, excuses from the guilt, and of
course from the punishment, of any criminal action committed under such deprivation of the
senses .... 'Id. (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24 - *25).
171 Id. at 331 (quoting I W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1-2 (71, ed. 1795)).
172 Id.
113 Id. at 332.
174 Id. See supra Part I for a discussion of the definition of mental retardation.
171 Id. at 332-33.
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have included some categories of mental retardation. 176 Even though
the Supreme Court has recognized that executing the profoundly or
severely mentally retarded may have been outlawed in the eighteenth
century, most people who reach the point of sentencing are mildly
retarded, and do not fall into the category of "idiots" and "lunatics."'
' 77
Therefore, the execution of the mentally retarded is not cruel and un-
usual punishment based on the first prong of the test.
Because executing the mentally retarded appears to have been an
acceptable punishment in the eighteenth century, the analysis must
continue to whether the evolving standards of decency have rendered
this type of punishment cruel and unusual. The Court in Atkins found
that a national consensus had developed against the execution of the
mentally retarded. At the time this case was decided, thirty-eight
states and the federal government provided for the death penalty for
certain types of murder. 78 Of these jurisdictions, eighteen states and
the federal government, or 47% of jurisdiction that have the death
penalty, outlawed the execution of the mentally retarded. 79 When
combined with the twelve states that do not have the death penalty,
60% of all states outlawed this type of execution.
This does not appear to be enough states to constitute a national
consensus. Although there is not a minimum number of states needed
to establish a national consensus, prior cases have generally required
a much higher percentage of states: 75% or more. 80  In fact, the
Court decided that a national consensus had not been established
when 42% of the states with the death penalty and 58% of all states
outlawed executing defendants who were sixteen years old when they
committed their crime.' 81 It seems very strange that a national con-
sensus is not formed when 42% of the death penalty states and 58%
of all states outlaw a practice but is formed if 47% of the death pen-
alty states and 60% of all states outlaw a practice. These miniscule
differences in percentages do not seem significant enough to shift
from no national consensus to forming one.
176 Id. at 333. "The common law prohibition against punishing 'idiots' for their crimes
suggests that it may indeed be 'cruel and unusual' punishment to execute persons who are pro-
foundly or severely retarded and wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of
their actions." Id.
177 Id. The Court seemed to suggest that the insanity defense and competency requirement
to stand trial afford protection to those people who may have been categorized as "idiots" and
"lunatics." Because Penry was found to be competent to stand trial and the jury rejected his
insanity defense, the Court rejected the notion that he belonged to either category. Id.
178 Juvenile Death Penalty Website, supra note 78.
79 Mental Retardation Website, supra note 28.
180 See supra Part ILI.B.
181 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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In addition, I agree with Justice Scalia's criticism of the major-
ity's argument in Atkins that there is evidence of a national consensus
because of the consistency in the direction of the change: "But in
what other direction could we possibly see change? Given that 14
years ago all the death penalty statutes included the mentally retarded,
any change (except precipitate undoing of what had just been done)
was bound to be in the one direction the Court finds significant
enough to overcome the lack of real consensus."'' 82 Therefore, be-
cause the Court does not appear to have followed its own precedent, I
do not agree with the Court that a national consensus has developed.
Although I do not agree with the Court that a national consensus
has developed, I agree with the Court's decision that executing the
mentally retarded is excessive. No valid peneological purpose of
punishment is served by executing the mentally retarded, and thus it
is disproportionate. Deterrence rests on the assumption that the of-
fender will perform a cost-benefit analysis before committing a crime.
This assumption is not valid when applied to mentally retarded of-
fenders. Characteristics of mental retardation include poor impulse
control and incomplete or underdeveloped concepts of moral blame-
worthiness and causation.' 83 Because of these characteristics, the
mentally retarded are unable to distinguish between events that result
from blameworthy behavior and those that do not, which in turn "im-
pairs their abilities to understand that certain consequences flow di-
rectly from particular acts."'
' 84
The mentally retarded are also not capable of acting with the de-
gree of culpability that would justify the death penalty. The defini-
tion of mental retardation itself describes this lack of culpability:
"significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior."' 85 As the Supreme
Court has recognized, this means that the mentally retarded are lim-
ited in their general ability to meet the standards of maturity, learning,
personal independence, and social responsibility that is expected of
someone at the same age and from the same cultural group. These
disabilities preclude the culpability necessary to justify the death pen-
alty. In addition, since Gregg, Supreme Court jurisprudence has con-
fined the death penalty to a narrow category of the most serious
crimes and criminals.' 87 In fact, in Godfrey v. Georgia, 88 the Court
12 Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2263 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183 Fetzer, supra note 133, at 439.
184 Id.
185 AAMR DEFINIION, supra note 17, at 25.
186 See Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2250-51; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432, 442 n.9 (1985).
' Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2251.
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set aside the death sentence for a defendant whose crimes did not re-
flect "a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any
person guilty of murder."' 89 As ,the Court stated in Atkins, "[i]f the
culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most
extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the
mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribu-
tion." 190
Because the mentally retarded offenders are not able to perform a
cost-benefit analysis and, because they have lesser personal culpabil-
ity than normal adults, the death penalty would be disproportionate to
the crimes that mentally retarded persons commit. Here, as with ju-
veniles, the death penalty is reduced to "purposeless and needless im-
position of pain and suffering."' 9 ' Therefore, executing the mentally
retarded is cruel and unusual punishment.
IV. SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
Executing the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The Court left to the states how to determine if a defendant is
mentally retarded.192 My suggested legislative approach reads as fol-
lows:
(A) Death Sentence Excluded. A defendant may be sentenced to
the maximum allowable term for a first-degree felony, but
not sentenced to death, if the Court and Jury find that, at the
time of the commission of the crime the defendant was
mentally retarded.
(B) As used in this section, mental retardation means:
(1) an IQ below 70-75,
(2) concurrently existing with limitations in two or more
skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social
skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety,
functional academics, leisure, and work, and
(3) which is manifested by age eighteen (18).
(C) Standard of Proof. In order to exclude a defendant from the
death penalty, he or she must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that he or she is mentally retarded.
First, this Note will analyze why this definition of mental retar-
dation should be used by comparing what tests state legislatures have
used. Then, it will analyze why the standard of proof should be a
88 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
1"9 Id. at 433.
90 Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2251.
191 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
192 Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2250.
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preponderance of the evidence and why that burden should be on the
defendant. This Note will conclude by confronting one of the obsta-
cles to this suggested legislative approach: the accuracy of IQ tests.
A. Which Definition of Mental Retardation?
Not only should the execution of the mentally retarded be treated
in a manner consistent with how the Supreme Court has treated the
execution of juveniles, but there should also be a standard definition
of mental retardation. This definition is necessary to fulfill the goals
of Furman: consistent application and fairness to the accused. By
comparing the definitions of states that ban the execution of the men-
tally retarded, this Note will argue that the 1992 AAMR definition of
mental retardation should be the one that is used to determine whether
an individual is mentally retarded.
The eighteen states that banned the execution of the mentally re-
tarded before Atkins used three primary legislative approaches. Four-
teen states defined mental retardation as significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning combined with deficits in adaptive
behavior that manifests during the developmental period. 193  Two
states defined it as a performance that is two or more standard devia-
tions from the mean score on standardized IQ tests combined with
deficits in adaptive behavior that manifests by age eighteen. 94 Fi-
nally, two states did not include a definition of mental retardation. 195
Although the states used three different definitions for mental re-
tardation, two of the definitions are actually synonymous. As was
stated above, 196 significant sub-average intellectual functioning is
quantified as an IQ of 70 or below. A performance that is two or
more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized IQ
test is approximately the same as a score of 70 or below. 97 There-
193 See ARiZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(b) (Michie 1993);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-9-401 (Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1310) (1990 & Supp.
1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130 (Michie 2001); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27 § 412(g)(1)
(1992); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030(1) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01(2) (2001); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1(B) (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(b) (1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.040(2) (2002); 2001 Conn.
Legis. Serv. 151 (West). Indiana is also counted in this group although its statute says that the
mental retardation must exist before age twenty-two. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-1-6 (West
Supp. 1994).
'94 See FLA. STAT. ch. 921.137(1) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-12601(i) (1997).
'9' See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12) (McKinney 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
23A-27A-26.2 (Michie 2002).
'96 See supra Part I.
'97 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 81, at 422.
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fore, it appears that all the states that utilized a definition of mental
retardation used the 1983 AAMR definition.' 98
Even though all the states used the 1983 AAMR definition of
mental retardation, the 1992 revision should be utilized instead. The
AAMR itself recognized that the 1983 definition was difficult for
laypersons to understand.' 99 The previous definition of adaptive be-
havior deficits was too difficult to conceive and measure.200 The
1992 definition is both more concrete and more flexible. It is con-
crete in the fact that it numerically establishes the maximum IQ that
qualifies someone as mentally retarded and categorizes deficits in
adaptive behavior into ten skill areas. 20 1 At the same time it is flexi-
ble by allowing a five-point IQ deviation.2 °2 More importantly, this
definition places a strong emphasis on adaptive skill areas and the
amount of support a mentally retarded person needs to function in the
world.20 3 By taking the primary focus off IQ tests, the concept of
mental retardation is more firmly grounded and better understood.
This will lead to a more consistent application of this legislative ap-
proach.
B. Standard of Proof
The defendant has the burden of proving, by the preponderance
of the evidence, that he or she is mentally retarded. Preponderance of
the evidence is defined as "superior evidentiary weight that, though
not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is
still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the
issue rather than the other.' '20 4 This is the same standard of proof that
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Walton v. Arizona,205 when it
held that it was constitutional for Arizona to impose upon the defen-
dants the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
the existence of mitigating factors. 206 The Supreme Court has also
upheld statutes that impose a preponderance of the evidence standard
to claims of self-defense 20 7 and the affirmative defense of extreme
emotional disturbance.20 8
198 For the definition and discussion of the 1983 AAMR definition of mental retardation,
see supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
199 Bing, supra note 17, at 70.
200 id.
201 id.
202 AAMR DEFINITION, supra note 17, at 25.
203 See supra Part I (discussing the 1992 AAMR test and the levels of needed support).
264 BLACk's LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (7th ed. 1999).
205 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
206 Id. at651.
207 Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
208 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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Although the role of mental retardation will change from being a
mitigating factor to being akin to an affirmative defense against the
death penalty, the standard of proof should remain the same. Even
with the more accurate definition of what mental retardation is, estab-
lishing that a particular defendant is retarded will not be easy. Be-
cause of the nature of mental retardation, it is often more difficult for
these offenders to contribute adequately to their defense: "The men-
tally retarded criminal defendant is more susceptible to police coer-
cion and to forced waiver of procedural rights.,,209 Lawyers have dif-
ficulty effectively communicating with these clients. In addition,
most people do not come into contact with mentally retarded indi-
viduals on a regular basis and do not fully understand the implications
of mental retardation. Furthermore, there is a question about the ac-
curacy of IQ tests.210 Therefore, a lesser standard of proof than rea-
sonable doubt should be used because a higher standard places a
greater burden on the mentally retarded defendant. It is better to in-
correctly find that a person is mentally retarded and impose a lesser
penalty than to execute someone who is incorrectly found to be not
retarded.
The burden of proof should be on the defendant. Since mental
retardation will be an affirmative defense, defendants should have the
burden of proof because that is the common practice when proving
affirmative defenses. Also, it would seem unfair to place this burden
on the prosecution. As the Court said in Walton, "[s]o long as a
State's method of allocating the burdens of proof does not lessen the
State's burden to prove every element of the offense charged ... a
defendant's constitutional rights are not violated by placing on him
the burden of proving mitigating circumstances sufficiently substan-
tial to call for leniency., 21 1 Because the defendant is using mental
retardation to call for an exemption from the death penalty, the defen-
dant should have the burden of proof.
C. The Accuracy of IQ Tests
IQ tests are essential tools that are used to determine if someone
is mentally retarded. Because mental retardation is partially defined
as someone with an IQ of 70-75, it is crucial to discuss the accuracy
and fairness of these tests. Since some researchers have found that IQ
tests are ineffective as the sole determinant of mental retardation,2t 2
209 Bing, supra note 17, at 145.
210 See infra Part iv.C.
211 497 U.S. 639, 650 (1990).
212 David L. Rumley, A License to Kill: The Categorical Exemption of the Mentally Re-
tarded from ihe Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1299, 1329-40 (1993).
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the 1992 AAMR definition is useful because it removes the sole em-
phasis for diagnosis from IQ tests and places more reliance on deficits
in adaptive behavior skills.
One of the most popular IQ tests is the Wechsler Memory Scale-
Revised (WAIS-R). This test is comprised of two parts: logical
memory and visual reproduction. It is designed to measure informa-
tional knowledge, auditory recall, concentration and distractibility,
comprehension, the ability to see relationships between events, and
other factors.213  There are guidelines and criteria for scoring this
test.214
IQ tests have received a number of criticisms, two of which are
the testing procedure and the perceived bias against minorities. The
WAIS-R test requires the subject to recount to the tester what he or
she has seen. It is then up to the tester to determine if the subject's
variation in vocabulary from the correct answer is acceptable. The
attitude of the examiner or any bias the tester may have against the
subject or the attitude of the examiner may play a role in scoring. 215
Not only do the testing procedures used create a bias, but the test it-
self also reflects a bias against minority groups. The WAIS-R test
"'reflects the values of the majority American culture, and persons
reared within that culture, all other things being equal, will excel on
that test.' 216 Because mentally retarded individuals are heavily con-
centrated in the lowest socioeconomic segments of society,217 this test
may not reflect their values and will create a bias against them. The
rationale behind this bias includes the different experiences and vo-
cabulary among ethnic groups, the placement of many minority chil-
dren into special education classes, which produces a stigma, and
other more general problems that the poor must face, such as under-
funded schools, inferior nutrition, and violent neighborhoods. 218 This
cultural bias will lead to false positives; more people will be diag-
nosed as mentally retarded who are in fact not. While the rationale
of prohibiting the execution of such individuals is based in part on
their lack of culpability, this decision was not made with the idea of
exempting more defendants than actually deserve it.
213 Bing, supra note 17, at 73.
214 id.
215 Id. (stating that "[a]ny bias the tester may have against the subject can play a large part
in scoring. Those tested by a cold, austere professional are likely to score a few points lower
than those who experienced a test with a friendly examiner.").
216 Id. at 74 (quoting ROBERT J. GREGORY, ADULT INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT 150
(1987)).
217 See MARY BEIRNE-SMITH ET AL., MENTAL RETARDATION 92-93 (4th ed. 1994) ("Chil-
dren who are born and reared in deprived, lower socioeconomic groups are 15 times more likely
to be labeled mentally retarded than children from the suburbs.").
218 Bing, supra note 17, at 74.
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Even with the above criticisms of IQ testing, such testing is still
a reasonable method to utilize when determining if an individual is
mentally retarded. First, there is no alternative, and it is better to have
some method than no method at all. Second, this method "provides
the practical benefit of a consistent standard generally accepted by
mental health professionals., 219 Finally, and most importantly, the IQ
test only determines one part of the definition of mental retardation.
The condition still must manifest before the individual is eighteen and
be coupled with existing limitations in two or more adaptive skill ar-
eas. This is the major reason why the 1992 AAMR definition of men-
tal retardation should be used: it takes the emphasis off IQ tests.
CONCLUSION
Executing the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amend-
ment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Mental re-
tardation is defined by the AAMR as an IQ below 70-75, existing
concurrently with limitations in two or more adaptive skill areas,
which is manifested by age eighteen. Many mentally retarded people
have limited communication skills, poor impulse control, and an un-
derdeveloped conception of blameworthiness. These same character-
istics are shared by juveniles. The Supreme Court held that executing
a child under the age of sixteen violated the Eighth Amendment be-
cause children are less culpable than adults and no state allows the
execution of such juveniles.
The Supreme Court was correct that mental retardation should be
treated as an absolute bar against the death penalty because it is cruel
and unusual punishment. The test for determining whether a punish-
ment is cruel and unusual is (1) it was a punishment that was out-
lawed during the Eighteenth century, (2) the standards of decency
have evolved so that this punishment is now unacceptable, or (3) the
punishment is excessive. When the Bill of Rights was enacted, it was
acceptable to execute the mentally retarded. However, the Court in-
correctly concluded that a national consensus was formed when only
eighteen states and the federal government prohibited this type of
punishment. When combined with the twelve states that do not have
the death penalty, 60% of the states banned executing the mentally
retarded. Based on past precedents, this was not a large enough per-
centage to form a national consensus. Even though the Court was
incorrect in its evolving standards of decency analysis, it was correct
that the punishment is excessive. Deterrence is not served because
this theory of punishment rests on the assumption that the offender
219 Id. at 75.
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will make a cost-benefit analysis before committing a crime. Because
of the characteristics of mental retardation, this cost-benefit analysis
cannot be performed. In addition, the mentally retarded are limited in
their general ability to meet the standards of maturity, learning, per-
sonal independence, and social responsibility that is expected of
someone at the same age and from the same cultural group. These
disabilities preclude the culpability necessary to require the death
penalty. Therefore, no valid peneological purpose of punishment is
served by this type of execution. Because of the lack of culpability a
mentally retarded person has, the death penalty becomes dispropor-
tionate to any crime committed.
It was correct for the Supreme Court to treat the mentally re-
tarded in a manner consistent with the way it treats juveniles, but the
states also need to establish a consistent definition of the disease and
how to implement such a law. First, the 1992 definition of mental
retardation should be used because it is more concrete and easier to
apply. While it provides a numerical ceiling for diagnosis, it allows
some flexibility for IQ tests. In addition, the focus is taken off these
tests, which are criticized for their lack of accuracy, and places more
emphasis on the deficits in behavioral skill areas. Second, the burden
of proving the existence of mental retardation by the preponderance
of the evidence should lie with the defendant. This recognizes that
mental retardation may not be easily understood by laypersons by
requiring a lesser burden of proof. At the same time, the burden of
proving such an affirmative defense from the death penalty should be
placed on the defendant, as all affirmative defenses are.
As Justice Stewart stated in Woodson, death is quantitatively dif-
ferent from life in prison. This punishment requires greater reliability
in sentencing than any other punishment because this one is irreversi-
ble. How can a society say that this greater reliability is met when it
executes someone who leaves the dessert from his last meal to cool
because he believes he will have a chance to eat it the next day, not
understanding that for him, there is no next day? 220 Banning the exe-
cution of the mentally retarded does not excuse these individuals from
their conduct. They are still punished; they are just not killed.
AMANDA M. RAINESt
220 Id. at 61 (describing the story of a mentally retarded Arkansas death row inmate).
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